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History 
Reborn
J Francis Fukuyama declared we’re all liberal 
democrats now. James Cotton disagrees. He ar­
gues the economies and societies of Asia show few 
signs of adapting to the western model.
A ccording to Francis Fukuyama, capital­ism and liberal democracy are tri­
umphant. Yet the difficulties 
with this view are many—not 
least the question of whether or 
to w hat extent the form er 
socialist and multi-ethnic states 
w ill adopt p o litical and 
economic systems which are 
both capitalist and democratic. 
If we can set aside the travails of 
the former Soviet Union and the 
former Yugoslavia as the in­
evitable consequences of tran­
sition , an even greater 
challenge to Fukuyama's argu­
ment is the course taken by the 
industrialised non-socialist 
states of Asia.
I want to argue here that, despite 
decades of rapid economic growth 
and conscious efforts to adapt a 
variety of western institutions and 
p ractices, the A sian N ew ly In­
dustrialising Countries (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) 
while capitalist, are far from liberal 
democratic. As their economies ma­
ture they have adopted democratic
political forms, but usually without 
liberal content. Nor is this situation 
likely to change. Indeed, with greater 
economic strength providing the basis 
for increased social and cultural self- 
confidence, they may be even less in­
clined in the future to borrow western 
liberal democratic practices or con­
form to what are perceived as western 
standards.
With the exception of Hong Kong, 
changes of government in the Asian 
NICs are now determined by formally 
democratic mechanisms. Singapore 
has been governed along Westminster 
lines since 1959, South Korea adopted 
representative institutions in 1987, 
and Taiwan em barked upon a 
thorough refurbishment of its political 
institutions starting in 1986. Even 
Hong Kong, though still run as a 
colony, now accords some role to elec­
toral and representative principles.
However, democratic forms and in­
stitutions by themselves are insuffi­
cient to produce liberal democracy. 
Precisely what else is required is a 
matter of some debate among political 
scientists. However, they would tend 
to look to the existence of relatively 
independent and influential interest 
groups and interests, or of attitudes 
and beliefs conducive to individual 
and group autonomy, or of limitations 
upon the activities and aspirations of
the state itself. Whichever of these fac­
tors contributes the most to liberalisa­
tion, it is significant that they are still 
largely absent from the Asian NIC 
states in the 1990s.
The first possibility to be considered is 
the possib le em ergence of 
autonom ous interest groups and 
those other features of civil society 
which made possible the democratic 
revolution of 1989-90 in Central 
Europe. Here there are some positive 
signs, most notably the upsurge in 
South Korea since mid-1987 of labour 
and of some professionals (including 
teachers and lawyers) against cor- 
poratist state controls. However, these 
developments do not necessarily con­
stitute a movement towards social 
and political pluralism. To take a 
Korean example, a union of teachers 
(the formation of which has become a 
cause celebre) devoted to advancing the 
class struggle and destroying the 
government cannot be taken as ad­
vancing the mechanisms of social con­
sensus. It must be recalled, however, 
that until 1987 ruthless (and often 
technically illegal) methods were cus­
tomarily employed against such or­
ganisations, and that their formation 
under the new dispensation is still in 
its learning phase.
In any event, more common has been 
the single issue mobilisation of inter -
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ests in Taiwan and South Korea 
(against American agricultural im­
ports, environmental problems, and 
the like), though in the former there 
are attempts to form a labour-oriented 
political movement—attempts, as yet 
ineffective at a time when the or­
ganised opposition to the Kuomin- 
tang is becom ing in creasin gly  
fragmented. Here the example of 
Japan illustrates the possibility that 
separately organised interests might 
even constitute their own political 
party and occupy influential positions 
in local government and elsewhere 
without gaining regular access to the 
p olicym aking m achinery  of the 
central state.
In Singapore, independent trade 
union or professional bodies are no 
more likely to appear in the 1990s than 
in the past. It was enough for the Law 
Society of Singapore in 1987 to dispute 
(as was its right and even its duty) the 
coherence of a draft bill giving the 
state powers to control publications 
which sought to interfere in or in­
fluence Singapore's internal politics to 
move the state to reorganise the legal 
profession. If anything , the Sin­
gaporean state is becoming more am­
bitious in its desire to control private 
interests. On the other hand, the un­
precedented m obilisation of the 
population of Hong Kong in 1989— 
first to support the democracy move­
ment in China, then to advance claims 
for the democratisation of the territory 
in advance of 1997—indicates that the 
quiescence of the past cannot be 
projected into the future. Unfor­
tunately for liberal democracy, the 
mechanisms of the post-1997 state will 
be even more unfavourable to expres­
sions of autonomous social interest 
than is the colonial state at present.
What of the development in the Asian 
NICs of popular attitudes and beliefs 
conducive to liberalisation? It is some­
times argued that with the transfor­
m ation of society  through 
industrialisation—and particularly as 
a result of urbanisation and the expan­
sion of the educated sectors of the 
population— forces and expectations 
are generated which are favourable to 
a more participatory political style. 
There is some general evidence to sup- 
port that view  from Korea and 
Taiwan—though in the case of Korea 
regional sentiment is still the single 
most powerful determinant of voting
behaviour (and much else), while in 
Taiwan the differences in outlook be­
tween voters of Taiwanese as against 
those of m ainland origin  often 
obscure the operation of other vari­
ables.
In Singapore the extensive degree of 
voter support for the divided and 
hamstrung opposition (almost four 
voters in every 10 in recent elections) 
could be taken to imply a similar 
phenomenon. In Hong Kong changes 
in attitude toward the government 
and the legal system, particularly 
among the young and better educated 
of the population, have been evident. 
Over time, such developments might 
permit the emergence of a more par­
ticipatory view of politics. However, 
such factors as the conduct of elites, 
the organisation of political parties, 
and the relationship between govern­
ment and bureaucracy suggest that 
such hopes may well be too optimistic.
Although the instruments of control 
wielded by regimes and ruling parties 
in the Asian NICs have become more 
sophisticated, the purposes for which 
they are wielded have remained the 
same for the past two decades. In­
stitutionalised political parties have
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yet to emerge in South Korea; rather, 
p o litica l m ovem ents are still 
dominated by regional (and in the 
case of the ruling party, military) in­
groups held together by ties of per­
sonal loyalty. The realignment of 
South Korean political parties in 1990 
is eloquent testimony to the continued 
prevalence of this situation: one of the 
key coup-makers of 1979 and the 
founder of the Korean CIA have com­
bined forces with the leading opposi­
tion figure of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, with the third figure (Kim 
Young-sam) now the next presidential 
candidate.
By contrast, the Kuom intang in 
Taiwan seems to have taken on the 
character of a 'hegemonic' party on 
the model of the Japanese Liberal 
D em ocratic or Ita lian  C hristian  
Democrats, its leadership sponsoring 
reforms which would have been 
anathema only a few years before. 
Within the Kuomintang, on the other 
hand, comparable democratic reforms 
have yet to be fully implemented. A 
combination of 'connections' (guanxi) 
and money still seems to be at the core 
of the party power structure. The spe­
cial conditions of Hong Kong make 
direct comparison difficult, but con­
tending for power with vocal radical 
groups are business-led factions dedi­
cated to defusing mass politics in 
order to deliver an orderly, subser­
vient and profitable Hong Kong to 
Beijing. The hereditary succession in 
Singapore speaks for itself. Again, the 
case of Japan illustrates that it is pos­
sible to sustain the politics of personal 
factions and privileged access to the 
bureaucracy in an advanced in­
dustrial state.
A further obstacle to the development 
of liberalisation may be seen in the 
continued influence in the Asian NICs 
of Confucianism. Central to Con­
fucianism is an ethical view of govern­
ment (which renders compromise 
morally repugnant), a belief in the su­
periority and duty to lead of the edu­
cated person (w hich undercuts 
notions of the legitimacy of popular 
interests), and a generally collectivist 
and organic conception of the state 
(which is less favourable to the action 
of individual citizens). While some 
commentators have demonstrated the 
existence of an individualist and per­
haps even a liberal tradition in East 
Asian thought, the lack of such no­
tions as individual and human rights 
cannot be disputed.
These trends are not without some 
contradictory developments. The 
achievement of economic goals of na- 
tion-building has been the rationale 
for the strong state in East Asia. With 
the growing maturity of the Asian 
economies (requiring the expansion of 
domestic demand, lower barriers to 
trade, and the internationalisation of 
domestic firms) there would appear to 
be less need for such a state. However, 
the Japanese state—often taken as the 
prototype of such a state—indicates 
that the capacity for a Ministry of In­
ternational Trade and Industry to im­
pose 'administrative guidance' on the 
private sector remains considerable.
In the 1980s there has been some 
liberalisation and internationalisation 
of the Taiwanese and South Korean 
econom ies—and in Korea the in­
dustrial conglomerates have become 
so large and far-flung that many of 
their activ ities are beyond easy 
government supervision. Against 
this, in Korea campaigns orchestrated 
by the government and ostensibly 
directed against the consumption of 
'luxuries' have amounted to a con­
tinuance by other means of the policy 
of managed trade.
There is still a long way to go before 
the interventionist inclinations of the 
Seoul authorities are relinquished. 
And in the political realm the forma­
tion of the Democratic Liberal Party 
suggests an attempt to form a Korean 
version of that symbiosis of political 
and bureaucratic personnel and busi­
ness money which has ruled Japan 
since 1955. Such a creation would cer­
tainly transform the Korean state; 
after all, it is often claimed that Japan 
has no policymaking core but, rather,
a number of contending bureaucratic 
centres held together by shared values 
and practices, whereas the Korean 
state has a unitary identity. However, 
even if this project is successful there 
will be a continuation of the assertion 
of the state against society. A similar 
development is much further ad­
vanced in Taiwan, where neither the 
representative organs of the state nor 
the bureaucracy can function inde­
pendently without the party. Aban­
doning its formal monopoly of power 
will probably ensure that in practical 
terms the Kuomintang (including 
members of its military arm) retains 
its predominance.
In South Korea and, to a lesser extent, 
in Taiwan, long-m aintained cor- 
poratist controls have begun to un­
ravel—though in Singapore they are, 
if anything, growing stronger. Again, 
in Hong Kong Beijing can be expected 
to employ its full panoply of cor- 
poratist mechanisms after 1997. Dis­
cord between the centre and the 
provinces may, however, temper these 
somewhat.
From this analysis it can be seen that, 
while the limits to liberalisation in the 
Asian NICs are obvious, all of these 
political and social systems are ex­
periencing considerable change, in 
some cases including the further in­
corporation of western social and 
political practices. But it is equally 
clear that these systems will not simp­
ly replicate the conventions of western 
liberal representative government. 
Political evolution should not be 
directly equated with increasing 
liberalisation. In the present world 
trend of democratisation such an out­
com e m ight be expected  (given 
favourable conditions) in the former 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and per­
haps Poland and the Baltic states. If 
Romania and the fragments of Yugos­
lavia (not to mention Turkey) are to 
escape this trend it is not altogether 
surprising that the same might be the 
case with the Asian NICs. Fukuyama 
should look beyond Europe to Asia.
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